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People v. Spencer 70
(decided January 17, 1995)
This action was brought by the defendant in order to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress physical evidence seized by the
New York City Police. 7 1 The defendant claimed that his right to
be free from unreasonable seizures was violated under both the
United States 72 and New York State73 Constitutions when police
officers stopped his vehicle in order to request information from
74
him, resulting in the discovery of marihuana and a hand gun.
The defendant claimed that the appellate division erred in holding
"that the police could validly stop his vehicle in order to request
information of him."' 75 The New York Court of Appeals held
that the stop of the defendant's vehicle, so that the officers could
ask defendant if he knew where a person for whom they were
searching could be found, was an unwarranted intrusion. 76
Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the appellate
division, granted the defendant's motion to suppress the physical
77
evidence, and directed the dismissal of the indictment.
On May 17, 1989, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Police
Officers Alonge and Conceicao, who were on routine patrol in a
marked car, received a radio report to investigate a complaint by
a woman who said she had been assaulted with a gun on the
previous day by her boyfriend. 78 After picking up the
70. 84 N.Y.2d 749, 646 N.E.2d 785, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483, cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 271 (1995).
71. Id. at 752, 646 N.E.2d at 787, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485.

72. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.., but upon probable cause.. .

."

Id.

73. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. Article I, section 12 provides in pertinent
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated... but upon probable cause.. . ." Id.
74. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 751, 646 N.E.2d at 787, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
75. Id. at 752, 646 N.E.2d at 787, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 759, 646 N.E.2d at 791, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 751, 646 N.E.2d at 786, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
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complainant, and with her in the car, the officers drove around
the neighborhood searching for the suspect. 7 9 After driving
around for "[n]o more than four or five minutes," 80 the
complainant observed the defendant seated in the driver's seat of
a double-parked car, and told the officer that he was a friend of
her boyfriend's and that her boyfriend may be nearby. 8 1 After
the defendant's car began to drive away, the officers, with their
turret lights on and car horn sounding, ordered him to pull
over. 82 As the officers approached the vehicle and shined their
lighted flashlights into the interior of the car, they observed a
"clear plastic bag containing green vegetable matter which they
believed to be marihuana," on the floor of the car. 83 The officers
then asked the defendant to exit the vehicle. 84 After the defendant
had exited the car, Officer Alonge observed the "butt" of a
revolver on the floor under the driver's seat. 85 After determining
that the gun was loaded, they placed the defendant under arrest.
He was subsequently charged with criminal possession of
marihuana in the fourth degree and criminal possession of a
weapon in the third degree. 86
The defendant made a motion to suppress the physical evidence
seized by the officers on the ground that the seizure violated his
right to be free from unreasonable seizure. 87 The suppression
court denied the motion after determining that the police officers
had "a right to request information of defendant and could stop
his car in order to effectuate that right." 88 The Appellate

79. Id.
80. Id.

81. Id. at 751, 646 N.E.2d at 786-87, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85.
82. Id.
83. Id.

84. Id. As the officers approached the vehicle, they observed a female in
the passenger seat who was also asked to exit the car. Id.
85. Id.

86. Id. The female passenger was released after the defendant admitted
that she had nothing to do with the alleged marijuana. Id.
87. Id. at 752, 646 N.E.2d at 787, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
88. Id. The suppression court stated that "at the time the police resolved to
exercise their right to request information, defendant's vehicle was in motion.
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Division, Second Department affirmed, 89 relying on People v.
John BB, 90 where the court of appeals held that "an automobile

stop made pursuant to a uniform, nonarbitrary, roving roadblock
was constitutionally permissible." 91
The court of appeals began its analysis by making a
determination that the stop of the defendant was in fact a seizure.
The threshold inquiry in determining the constitutional scope for
a routine traffic check is whether such a stop is a seizure within

the meaning of constitutional limitations. 92 The United States
Supreme Court has determined that whenever an officer detains
an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
seized that person. 9 3 Accordingly, the New York Court of
Appeals has held that a "stop of an automobile as for a 'routine
94
traffic check' is a seizure within constitutional limitations."
The court in Spencer stated that:
[a]lthough the right to stop a vehicle is generally analogous to the
right to stop a pedestrian, police/motorist encounters must be
Under these circumstances, common sense demands that they be permitted to
stop it." Id.
89. 193 A.D.2d 90, 602 N.Y.S.2d 412 (2d Dep't 1993). The appellate
division stated that the police had acted reasonably when they stopped the
defendant's vehicle so they could request information as to the location of the
suspect. Id. at 95, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 415-16.
90. 56 N.Y.2d 482, 438 N.E.2d 864, 453 N.Y.S.2d 158, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1010 (1982).
91. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 752, 646 N.E.2d at 787, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485
(citing People v. John BB, 56 N.Y.2d 482, 488, 438 N.E.2d 864, 867, 453
N.Y.S.2d 158, 162, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1010 (1982)).
92. People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 418, 330 N.E.2d 39, 42, 369
N.Y.S.2d 67, 72 (1975).
93. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968). Although the encounter in
Terry took place between a policeman and pedestrians on a public sidewalk, an
analogous interpretation has been made between a motorist who is "detained"
by turret lights and a police car horn and "restrained" by a police officer for a
specific purpose. See, e.g., People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725, 727, 609 N.E.2d
113, 114, 593 N.Y.S.2d 760, 761 (1992) ("[W]hen the police, using red turret
lights, a spotlight and a loudspeaker, ordered defendant to pull the car over,
defendant was effectively 'seized.'"); Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d at 418, 330 N.E.2d at
43, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
94. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d at 418, 330 N.E.2d at 43, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 72-73.
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distinguished from police/pedestrian encounters when the police
are operating on less than reasonable suspicion... because "the

obvious impact of stopping the progress of an automobile is more
intrusive than the minimal intrusion involved in stopping a

pedestrian.. . ."95

Additionally, the court noted that it has been established in New
York that stops of automobiles by the police are only legal if

done pursuant to a routine, non-pretextual traffic check to enforce
a traffic regulation or where the officers have at least a
reasonable suspicion that an occupant of the vehicle has
committed or is in the process of committing a crime. 9 6 In
People v. May, 97 police officers observed a couple sitting in a
parked vehicle on a street known for criminal activity. 98 As the

police approached, with the patrol car's red turret lights and a
spotlight on, the car began to drive away, and the driver was

subsequently ordered to pull over. 9 9 The court held that the basis
for the order to stop, namely the common-law right of inquiry,
failed to satisfy the established constitutional standards unless

"the officers had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." 1 0 0
95. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 752, 646 N.E.2d at 787, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485
(quoting John BB, 56 N.Y.2d at 487, 438 N.E.2d at 867, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
161). The court also noted that the common-law right to inquiry does not
include the rights to unlawfully seize, much less the right to request
information. Id. See People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559, 563, 373 N.E.2d
1218, 1220, 402 N.Y.S.2d 993, 995-96 (1978); People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d
106, 114, 324 N.E.2d 872, 878, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509, 517 (1975).
96. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 752, 646 N.E.2d at 787-88, 622 N.Y.S.2d at
485-86. See People v. Harrison, 57 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 443 N.E.2d 447, 450,
457 N.Y.S.2d 199, 202 (1982) (holding that if the police are to forcibly detain,
constructively stop or exercise restraint over an individual there must be some
articulable facts sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that the person is
involved in criminal acts or posed some danger to the officers).
97. 81 N.Y.2d 725, 609 N.E.2d 113, 593 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1992).
98. Id. at 727, 609 N.E.2d at 115, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
99. Id.

100. Id. The Spencer court noted that nothing would have prevented the
police in May from questioning the occupants of the vehicle pursuant to the
common-law right of inquiry while the car was still parked, based on a
"founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,' which permits 'interference
with a citizen to the extent necessary to gain explanatory information, but short
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The court made it clear that the right to stop a moving vehicle
is subject to a stricter standard than the right to approach
occupants of a parked vehicle. 10 1 In People v. Harrison,102 the
court held that, although the police do not need a reasonable
suspicion to approach a citizen or parked car and request
information, a reasonable suspicion is needed if an officer is to
forcibly detain or constructively stop a person by ordering the
driver or occupant to remain in the car. 10 3 Thus, the Spencer
court determined that, as was the case in May, once the defendant
indicated an unwillingness to speak to the police officers by
driving away, they should not have stopped him without a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 104 As the May court
stated:
The police may . . . detain civilians in order to question them,
however, without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and
once defendant indicated, by pulling away from the curb, that he
did not wish to speak with the officers, they should not have
forced him to stop without legal grounds to do so. Any other rule
would permit police seizures solely if circumstances existed
105
presenting a potential for danger.
Based on this analysis, the court concluded that the stop of
Spencer was a seizure, and next had to determine whether the
stop was reasonable. 106
In People v. Scott, 107 the New York Court of Appeals stated
that whether a seizure is "reasonable" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment is determined "by balancing its intrusion on
of a forcible seizure." Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 753, 646 N.E.2d at 788, 622
N.Y.S.2d at 486 (quoting People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, 374
N.E.2d 562, 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 385 (1976)).

101.
102.
103.
104.

Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 753, 646 N.E.2d at 788, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
57 N.Y.2d 470, 443 N.E.2d 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1982).
Id. at 476, 443 N.E.2d at 450, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 753, 646 N.E.2d at 788, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 486.

105. People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725, 728, 609 N.E.2d 113, 115, 593

N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (1992).
106. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 753-54, 646 N.E.2d at 788, 622 N.Y.S.2d at
486.
107. 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984).
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the Fourth Amendment interests of the individual involved
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." 1 08
The focus of the balancing test is on the relation between the
governmental interest involved and "the degree of intrusion of
the procedure on the individual subjected to it, measured in terms
of both its subjective effect and the degree of discretion vested in
the officials charged with carrying it out." 10 9 Applying this test,
the Spencer court concluded that the governmental interest here
was outweighed by the nature and degree of the police
intrusion. 110 In United States v. Hensley, 111 the United States
Supreme Court discussed the nature of this governmental interest
when past criminal activity is what is being investigated in the
context of the Fourth Amendment balancing test. The Court
stated:
The factors in the balance may be somewhat different when a
stop to investigate past criminal activity is involved rather than a
stop to investigate ongoing criminal conduct. This is because the
governmental interests and the nature of the intrusions involved
in the two situations may differ. As we noted in Terry, one
general interest present in the context of ongoing or imminent
criminal activity is "that of effective crime prevention and
detection."

. . .

Similarly,

the exigent circumstances

which

require a police officer to step in before a crime is committed or
completed are not necessarily as pressing long afterwards. Public
safety may be less threatened by a suspect in a past crime who
now appears to be going about his lawful business than it is by a
12
suspect who is currently in the process of violating the law. 1
108. Id. at 525, 473 N.E.2d at 3, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
109. Id. at 525, 473 N.E.2d at 4, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
110. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 754, 646 N.E.2d at 788, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
The court found that, although the interest in investigation and detection of past
criminal activity was significant, it did not "implicate the same important
social objectives that are at issue when police are investigating recent or
ongoing suspected criminal activity." Id. See United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 228 (1985) ("A stop to investigate an already completed crime does
not necessarily promote the interest of crime prevention as directly as a stop to
investigate suspected ongoing criminal activity.").
111. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 221.
112. Id. at 228 (citations omitted).
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In United States v. Ward, 113 the Ninth Circuit held that the stop
of the defendant by the FBI constituted a seizure and that such a
stop of the defendant's vehicle to interview him regarding a
federal fugitive was an unreasonable intrusion. 114 Accordingly,
115
materials discovered as a result of the stop were inadmissible.
There were several critical aspects to the court's analysis. First
was the fact that there was not crime "afoot." 116 Second was the
fact that there was not an emergency which required immediate
action on behalf of the agents. 117 Last, and most important to the
court, was the fact that the stop was not based on a "founded
suspicion that the detainee was involved or about to be involved
in criminal activity." 118
Similarly, the Spencer court concluded that the stop of the
defendant "clearly did not warrant a 'preventative governmental
interest in the stop,"' and that the police activity was
unreasonable. 119 The New York Court of Appeals found that
there was absolutely no evidence in the record indicating that the
complainant was in any future danger, there was not any
indication the she had previously been assaulted by the suspect,
nor was there evidence to support the inference that the suspect
was dangerous. 120 According to the court of appeals, the only
113. 488 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1973).
114. Id. at 168.
115. Id. at 170.

116. Id. at 169. According to the court, the FBI agents stopped the
defendant pursuant to a criminal investigation that had begun several months
earlier. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. People v. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d 749, 755, 646 N.E.2d 785, 789, 622
N.Y.S.2d 483, 487, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 271 (1995). The dissent argued
that there was greater compelling governmental interest than just the detection
of past criminality. Id. at 762, 646 N.E.2d at 793, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 491
(Levine, J., dissenting). Judge Levine felt the facts of the case, "notably the
assailant's particularized personal hostility toward the victim and his use and
continuing possession of a handgun, readily support a preventative
governmental interest in the stop, in addition to the interest in detecting a past
crime." Id. (Levine, J., dissenting).
120. 1d. at 755, 646 N.E.2d at 789, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 487. Furthermore,
the court noted that the circumstances of the case supported this conclusion. Id.
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reason that the officers stopped defendant was the premise that he
was a possible or even probable source of information regarding
the suspect's whereabouts. 12 1 The court of appeals found that the
intrusiveness of pulling over the defendant's freely moving
vehicle could not be justified "[w]hen the governmental interest
in finding and apprehending the suspect in this case is considered
in relation to the effectiveness of the procedures chosen to
promote it." 122
The New York Court of Appeals next stated that the seizure
was also unreasonable when measured in terms of the amount of
discretion vested in the officers. 12 3 "It must be kept in mind that
this defendant was not the subject of individualized suspicion. In
the absence thereof, other safeguards are necessary to ensure that

his reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject solely to the
discretion of the police."

124

In People v. John BB, 125 the New

York Court of Appeals held that the police were not prohibited
There was a 43-hour time lapse between the time of the alleged assault and the
stop of the defendant, and the officers had not even gone to the suspect's home
to search for him before stopping the defendant. Id. However, the dissent once
again disagreed. Judge Levine stated that "a degree of urgency was present in
that the police justifiably believed that defendant would give them information
on the assailant's immediate whereabouts." Id. at 762, 646 N.E.2d at 793, 622
N.Y.S.2d at 491 (Levine, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 757, 646 N.E.2d at 790, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 488. The court also
stated that less intrusive alternatives could have been used in this situation. Id.
The court was also careful to note that the governmental interest involved in
this case must be considered in its specific context, as this case involved the
"investigation of past criminal activity; the stop of a third person not suspected
of criminal activity; the absence of exigent circumstances justifying immediate
police action; the availability of less intrusive alternatives; and the candid
testimony of the officers, who considered defendant no more than a possible
source of information." Id. at 757-58, 646 N.E.2d at 790, 622 N.Y.S.2d at
488.
123. Id. See People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 525, 473 N.E.2d 1, 4, 483
N.Y.S.2d 649, 652 (1984).
124. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 758, 646 N.E.2d at 790-91, 622 N.Y.S.2d at
488-89. The court stated that the stop of the defendant was "standardless and
unconstrained." Id. at 758, 646 N.E.2d at 791, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
125. 56 N.Y.2d 482, 438 N.E.2d 864, 453 N.Y.S.2d 158, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1010 (1982).
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from using a roving roadblock which was conducted in a
"nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory and uniform procedure for the
purpose of ascertaining the identity of the occupants and
obtaining information concerning criminal activity in [an] area"
in which there had been a large number of burglaries.1 26 The
Spencer court distinguished John BB on two grounds. First, the
degree of the intrusion in John BB was far less than in the
present case in that all motorists were stopped in an "impersonal,
random manner and no individual was singled out." 12 7 Second,
the court, in John BB, found that the stop and search of the
defendant was not unreasonable because the element of
arbitrariness had been eliminated. 12 8
Finally, the Spencer court determined that the scale of justice
was tipped in favor of the suppression of the evidence seized. 129
"The exclusionary rule has as an objective the social benefit of
deterring unlawful police conduct [which] ...necessarily entails

balancing the cost of the loss of probative evidence against the
gain in deterring lawless police conduct." 130 Based on the
circumstances surrounding the stop of the defendant, the court
determined that "when the foreseeable deterrent effect against
unlawful police conduct is fairly balanced against the adverse
impact of suppression upon the truth-finding process, the scale
13 1
tips decidedly in favor of suppression."
126. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 758, 646 N.E.2d at 791, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 489
(citing John BB, 56 N.Y.2d at 488, 438 N.E.2d at 867, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 161).
127. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 758, 646 N.E.2d at 791, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
128. John BB,56 N.Y.2d at 488, 438 N.E.2d at 867, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 161.

The court said that the "element of arbitrariness has been identified time and
again as a critical factor in determining the reasonableness of official
investigative activity of an intrusive nature." Id. See, e.g., United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976); People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d
210, 217, 352 N.E.2d 562, 568, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (1976); People v.
Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 420, 330 N.E.2d 39, 44, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 74 (1975).

129. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 759, 646 N.E.2d at 791, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
130. People v. Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d 351, 354-55, 538 N.E.2d 76, 78, 540
N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (1989).
131. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d at 759, 646 N.E.2d at 791, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 489.

The court further noted that "[i]f the instant stop were permissible and
motorists could in fact be pulled over at an individual police officer's
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both

the New

York State

and

United

States

Constitutions, an individual is considered "seized" when he or
she has been detained and his or her freedom to walk away has
been restrained. 1 32 Additionally, both constitutions require that

such a seizure must be accompanied by a reasonable suspicion of
criminality. 133 Absent this reasonable suspicion, both
constitutions require the suppression of any evidence obtained
during the seizure. 134
135
People v. Yancy
(decided July 14, 1995)

Appellants, Derek Yancy and Joseph Chapman, challenged the
denial of motions to suppress physical evidence seized by police
136
officers during warrantless searches of each appellant's car.
The ground for appeal was based on a violation of the New York
State Constitutional 137 and the Fourth Amendment 138 protections
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 139 The New York
Court of Appeals, in a consolidated opinion, denied their motions
and held that in both instances the police officers had probable
discretion based upon the mere right to request information, a Pandora's box
of pretextual police stops would be opened." Id.
132. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968); People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d
413, 418, 330 N.E.2d 39, 43, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 72 (1975).
133. See People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725, 728, 609 N.E.2d 113, 115, 593
N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (1992).
134. See Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d at 354-55, 538 N.E.2d at 78, 540 N.Y.S.2d at
759.
135. 86 N.Y.2d 239, 654 N.E.2d 1233, 630 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1995).
136. Id. at 242, 654 N.E.2d at 1234, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 986.
137. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This section provides in relevant part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated... but upon
probable cause.. . ." Id.

138. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.., but upon probable cause ..... Id.
139. Yancy, 86 N.Y.2d at 243, 654 N.E.2d at 1234, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 986.
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